THE ROOTS, STRATEGIES, AND POPULAR PERCEPTION OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN INDONESIA

 

 

 

 

THE ROOTS, STRATEGIES, AND POPULAR PERCEPTION OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN INDONESIA1

 

 

 

Introduction

Southeast Asian Islam has recently been exposed to a problem of Islamic radicalism. Within the Southeast Asia region, the issue of Islamic radicalism has been given a wide coverage by media. A large percentage of the Muslim population of the world lives in this region, and thus Islamic radicalism is an issue of immense significance in the region.  Certainly,  al-Qaeda,  which  is  regarded  as  the  number  one Islamic terrorist group in the world, is not based in the region. However, it has been suggested that al-Qaeda has links with other radical groups in the region —groups said to be responsible for the

 

1 The earlier version of this paper was first presented to the international conference “Tolerance and Intolerance: Rethinking Interfaith Relation in Indonesia” organsied by Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (STAIN, State Islamic College) Tulungagung in Tulungangung - Indonesia, 20 November 2010.

 

 

bomb attacks in the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Since  Islamic  radicalism  has  drawn  the  attention  of  the  world, Southeast Asian Islam also becomes a subject of scholarly discussion.

This paper examines Islamic radicalism particularly in Indonesia in terms of its roots and  strategies of action. While focusing on the Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI, lit. “Islamic Community”) as the larger subject of discussion, it takes Ar Rahmah Media Network with its print publication of Jihad Magazine (Jihadmagz) in particular as the case of study. The paper argues that the emergence of Islamic radicalism is mainly triggered by the combination of the ruling regime’s political repression, crucial socio-economic deprivation, globalisation, and Arabia support. Also, it further argues that there is a shift of strategies among activists of radical Muslims in delivering their messages as well as in conducting their radical actions.

To begin with, the paper explores the roots of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. In what follows, it discusses  the shift of  local people’s perception of Islamic radicalism. Central to the discussion of this shift are the popular responses towards Islamic radicalism, particularly the issue of the existence of JI in Indonesia and the radical, violent actions by activists of this group. At the end, the paper investigates the diverse strategies  the  activists  of  radical  Muslims  shift  from  one  time  to another in delivering their messages to wider audience.

The paper argues that Islamic radicalism is not a make-up story in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. In an earlier phase, it further argues,  local  people  of  the  country  split  into  diverse  kinds  of perception about Islamic radicalism. One striking perception was the doubt of the existence of radical Muslim groups, particularly JI. The success of the police in chasing the perpetrators of violent actions has then  reduced  the  popular  doubt,  and  made  popular  perception changed from doubt to how to save people from radical ideas of Islam. Despite this, in later development, the public gives an “excuse” to Islamic radicalism, some by responding to it in a fairly positive way. This later public response is partly a result of the diverse strategies of Islamic radical groups in delivering their messages to the public, consisting of physical action and publication.

 

The Roots of Islamic Radicalism

Islamic radicalism has strongly colored the picture of Islam  in contemporary Indonesia. The face of Indonesian Islam is identified with some radical Muslims-based groups, such as Front Pembela Islam

 

 

(FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council), Laskar Jihad (LJ, Jihad Paramilitary Troops), and Jama’ah Ikhwan al-Muslimun Indonesia (JAMI, Indonesian Ikhwan al-Muslimun Community). Even though Islamic radical groups do not have significant number in comparison with moderate ones, such as Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU, The Awakening of Muslim Scholars) and Muhammadiyah, they can draw the popular attention.2     These   groups   are   prominent   in   the   contemporary Indonesian Islam for their literal religious understanding and radical actions.

There are a lot of examples to show the radical actions of such

groups. FPI has been involved in a number of raids and destruction of several cafés, discotheques, night clubs, gambling dens, and other socially “bad places”, just as LJ has had an intimate connection to the jihadist actions in Maluku, Ambon and Poso of Central Sulawesi. In these  conflicting  areas,  LJ  has  sent  its  militias  to  fight  against Christians.  Meanwhile,  the  Amir  Majlis  (the  leader  of  the  advisory board) of MMI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is believed by such groups as Washington-based magazine, Time in its edition “Confession of an al- Qaeda Terrorist”,3 Lee Kuan Yew in his address at the Conference on Asia Security by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,4  and above all by the US Bush administration, to be leading JI, a Muslim group believed to have networks throughout Southeast Asia, in particular Singapore and Malaysia, and to be allegedly linked to Al- Qaeda.

Much attention has been given to such Islamic radical groups. While MMI with Ba’asyir as its leader, as described by Huang,5  is allegedly responsible for the unsolved bombings in several places of Indonesia  and  the  Philippines,  LJ  is  believed  to  have  played  a significant role in the worsening of religious conflicts in several areas

of Indonesia. Some commentators differently discern the involvement of LJ in such conflicts. Fealy notes that the sending of the Laskar

 

 

2 Azyumardi Azra, “Agama dan Otentisitas Islam,” Republika, 25 October 2002.

3 See “Confession of an al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time Magazine, 23 September 2002.

4 Sidney Jones, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia

(Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), p. 2.

5  Reyko Huang, “Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response,”  Terrorism

Project, 8 February 2002, p. 1.

 

 

militias to the areas of conflict, particularly in Maluku, resulted from the low capacity of the state to end the conflict and from the finding suggesting  that  Muslims  were to  be  driven  out  from  the  areas  as Protestant churches had plans to build Christian state consisting of Maluku, West Papua and North Sulawesi.6 Unlike Fealy, Marshall regards LJ  as  the responsible for  the aggravation  of  the  conflicts. According to Marshall, LJ is the cause of the deterioration of the conflicts as the coming of LJ militias in Maluku and Sulawesi hindered the attempts of reconciliation between the conflicting groups. Marshall also points out that LJ had plans to drive out all Christians and to establish an extreme version of Islamic law, particularly in Sulawesi.7

Such reported cases of Islamic radicalism might send a significant message that religious radicalism is frequently followed by violent actions. There is a parallel connection between religious radicalism and violence as the radicalism appears in the form of social resistance in accordance to its own religious understanding. There are, at least, three general tendencies of the radicalism. First, radicalism is perceived as a response towards the existing conditions, including assumption, idea, value, and institution regarded as deviant. Second, radicalism is not restricted to the form of such resistance, but also accompanied by an attempt to change the existing order with another one supposed to be better. Third, radicalism is equipped with a strong belief in a certain ideology and program, which can result in emotional reaction and violence.8

Even    though    Islamic    radicalism    becomes    a    picture    of

contemporary Indonesian Islam, some commentators, while tending to come to the agreement that such Islamic radicalism is a new phenomenon for Indonesia, relate the phenomenon to the crisis suffered by the country. According to Hasan, Islamic radicalism, as a new phenomenon in Indonesia, is inseparable from the so-called multi-

 

 

6 Greg Fealy, “Inside the Laskar Jihad: An Interview with the Leader of a New, Radical and Militant Sect,” Inside Indonesia (January-March 2001), available at: http://www. insideindonesia.org/edit65/fealy.htm (Cited 15/04/02).

7 Paul Marshall, “Terror’s Not New to Indonesia,” Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom

House  (15  October  2002).  Available  at:  [http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/-

 cou ntry/ ind onesi a/ Terror’ s% 20N ot% 20New%t o% 20I nd onesia .htm  ]       (Cited       in

14/11/02).

8  Khamami Zada, “Terorisme dan Radikalisme Agama,” Media Indonesia, 18 Oktober

2002.

 

 

dimensional crisis befalling the country since it started emerging in

1997 when Soeharto’s regime was coming to the collapse. It seems to Hasan that Islamic radicalism had its moments when the country felt in the overwhelming crisis.9 In addition, Zada maintains that the fall of Soeharto provides Islamic radicalism with invaluable moments to accelerate  its  movement.10   The  change  of  political  leadership  in

Indonesia is likely to bring about the emergence of the alternative ideology in place of the previous one, and the ideology which seems to be more accurate to cover the movement of some contemporary Indonesian Muslims, according to Barton, is Islamism. The ideology which  believes  Islam  can  and  should  form  the  basis  of  political ideology, in Barton’s view,11 can be the beginning of Islamic radicalism.

Certainly, the post-Soeharto era with its unsolved crises became a worthy  moment  for  the  emergence  of  Islamic  radicalism.  The

phenomenon of Islamic radicalism became more visible in the post- Soeharto era as the wide coverage of media towards their actions made their movements more influential. Van Bruinessen, while depicting Islamic radicalism as one of the most conspicuous new phenomena in contemporary Indonesian Islam, suggests that such Islamic radical groups had much power against the state authority at the time of the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. He gives an example that they often gained control of the streets under the unwillingness of the army and police to restrain them.12

Such analyses on the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia play an important role in looking at the wider phenomena of Islamic radicalism across Southeast Asia as a whole, especially when it has been already found that some Islamic radicalism in the region have been interconnected. Indonesia which has been noted for long time as being occupied by Moderate Muslims, and has the world’s largest Muslim population, is now repeatedly claimed by several groups as a

country with serious problems of Muslim terrorist and radical groups,

 

9 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamic Radicalism and the Crisis of the Nation-State,” Available

at: http//www.isim.nl/newsletter/7/regional/1.html (Cited in 14/11/02).

10  Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia

(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 88.

11  Greg Barton, “Islamism and Indonesia: Islam and the Contest for Power after

Soeharto,” The Review (September 2002), p. 2.

12   Martin  van  Bruinessen,  “Genealogies  of  Islamic  Radicalism  in  Post-Soeharto

Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, no. 2, vol. 10 (July 2002): p. 118.

 

 

particularly in the aftermath of bomb blast in sites such as Kuta Bali and Marriot Jakarta. As pointed out by Fealy,13  such countries as the US, Singapore and Malaysia claim to have evidence of Indonesians leading offshore terrorist groups or of terrorists being based in Indonesia, and moreover, Singaporean senior minister Lee Kwan Yew, as indicated by Tempo,14 claimed that Indonesia was a ‘hotbed of terrorism’. This intensifies the significance of analysis of why people become radicalised in the middle of the changing socio-political and economic situations within the course of the nation.

Some commentators have different opinions on the problem of why people become radical individuals. According to general view of

terrorism, as suggested by Ramakrishna,15  people become radicalised by a nexus of political repression and crucial socio-economic deprivation; or in other words, they become so if the government conducts repressive measures towards the protests and aspirations of the society while it fails to provide them with, not to mention all, economic growth, proper jobs, and affordable education. From this view, an understanding can be drawn that radicalism results from two key points: political suppression by the government and socio- economic downturn.

Such general view does not seem to be precisely the case in some

Southeast Asian countries, however. Even though political repression

and socio-economic decline have been the raison d’tre for the Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia, there are other factors in the prevalence of radicalism: globalisation and Arabia. Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia emerges, while in response to “political repression” and “poor governance”, as a result of the global awareness of Muslims in the region of the developments in the Islamic world, which creates anti- American sentiment. Globalisation can be depicted as having poured more fuel on Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia as Muslims of the region become aware that the problems facing the wider Islamic world resulting  from  a  biased  US  foreign  policy,  while  their  national

 

 

13  Greg Fealy, “Is Indonesia a terrorist base?,” Inside Indonesia (July-September 2002), available at: http://www.insideindonesia.org/ edit71/fealy1.htm (Cited 19 November

2002).

14 “Diakah Sang Imam?,” Tempo (3 November 2002), p. 25.

15  Kumar Ramakrishna, “Jemaah Islamiah: Aims, Motivations and Possible Counter-

Strategies,” Perspective (October 2002), p. 1.

 

 

governments  have  not  done  much  to  help  change  “Washington’s

policy mind-set”.

Thus, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is given rise by four major factors: political repression, poor governance, global awareness, and Arabia. It is frequently argued, as reported by International Crisis Group (ICG) in its “Indonesia Briefing” section, that the New Order

regime’s high suppression of political Islam contributed to the radicalisation of Muslim dissent.16  Moreover, the increase in Islamic radicalism  is  basically  the  outcome  of  the  government  failure  to enforce the law and to solve socio-religious conflicts and the result of the abrupt decline of central government authority. Besides political struggle as well as poor governance as the roots, van Bruinessen adds that the present Islamic radicalism in Indonesia results also from global awareness, which paves the way for the establishment of transnational Islamic networks.17  In addition, Azra suggests that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is closely related to the role of some Arab descendent figures in the groups of FPI, MMI, and LJ since they tend to take rigid and rigorous ways to come to their goals instead of persuasive and peaceful ones.18 Hefner admits that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has come to its prominence with the significant contribution of financial assistance from Saudi Arabian authorities.19

Meanwhile,  in  Singapore  and  Malaysia,  political  repression  and

socio-economic decline do not  seem to be the  key factors of  the Islamic radicalism. This is not to say that political and socio-economic reasons are not the factors of Islamic radicalism in both countries, but rather that there is another factor to be more apparent for it. Ramakrishna maintains that the most important factor and very basic cause of Islamic radicalism, as represented by JI extremism, in Singapore  and  Malaysia  are  ideological,  not  socio-economic  or political.   All   the   31   JI   detainees   in   Singapore,   according   to Ramakrishna, are not “the children of poverty and despair”, but they

 

16  International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 10 October 2002), p. 3.

17 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism,” p. 118.

18 Azra, “Agama dan Otentisitas Islam.”

19   Robert  W.  Hefner,  “Globalisation,  Governance,  and  the  Crisis  of  Indonesian Islam,” (Unpublished paper presented to the Conference on Globalisation, State Capacity, and Muslim Self Determination, Center for Global, International, and Regional Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, 7-9 March 2002), p. 24.

 

 

are “gainfully employed” and own their homes encompassing HDB five-room or executive flats. In the matter of non-socio-economic and political factors of the Islamic radicalism in Malaysia, the roots can be traced to the background of its activists. Ramakrishna indicates that several leading activists of Islamic radical groups are the principals of schools, graduates and lecturers of universities.20  These kinds of job positions suggest a gainful employment, and show that the members of Islamic radicalism, who hold these job positions, occupy an upper level in the community in terms of the socio-economic status.

From the phenomenon of the Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, there is one significant feature that Islamic radicalism does not appear

from  zero  point  or  without  any  affiliation  to  the  others.  Van Bruinessen maintains that Islamic radical groups in Indonesia can be traced to two roots: national and transnational networks.21 While national network refers to two relatively “indigenous” previous Muslim political  movements,  the  Darul  Islam  (DI)  movement  and  the Masyumi Party, transnational network relates to a number of such more recent transnational Islamic links as the sponsor groups, which are identified  by  van  Bruinessen22   with  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait,  and Pakistan.

From such a perspective, the DI movement and the Masyumi

Party  have  inspired  the  activists  of  current  Islamic  Radicalism  in

Indonesia,  and  thus  have occupied  a  certain  place  in  their  hearts. Having been ordered to dissolve itself in early 1960s, according to van Bruinessen23  and ICG,24   Masyumi transformed its political struggle then into, one of the things, the missionary efforts among Indonesian Muslims under the name of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, the Indonesian Dakwah Council) in 1967. The two prominent figures, which are claimed to be leading JI, Ba’asyir and Sungkar, are indicated by van Bruinessen to be well connected to DDII circles.25

Van Bruinessen also indicates that one of the most active Islamic

radical groups, MMI, in which Ba’asyir used to occupy the position of

 

20 Ramakrishna, “Jemaah Islamiah,” pp. 1-3.

21 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism, p. 118.

22 Ibid., p. 149.

23 Ibid., p. 122.

24 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims, p. 11.

25 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism, p. 129.

 

 

leadership, encompasses the sections of the DI movement of the foregoing decades.26 Hefner also points out that among those in MMI organisation’s rank are individuals associated with the DI group.27 The connection  of  the  alleged  terrorist  organisation,  JI,  to  the  DI movement, according to Jones,28 has gained justification from the intimate relationship between Ba’asyir and Sungkar and Kadungga, a son in law of Kahar Muzakkar, the leader of DI movement in South Sulawesi.

In sum, globalisation has met with localisation (“glocalisation”) to become two contributing factors for Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia. Globalisation has raised the awareness of Muslims of the global

situation facing Islamic world. This awareness has generated Muslims’ reaction to the existing situations they face, using lots of their possible religious and financial resources. This condition has been devastated by the reduced capacity of the state where Muslims stay in, coupled with socio-economic downturn, to deal with radicalism and violation within the country.

 

The Unresolved Jama’ah Islamiyah as a Radical Group

Jama’ah Islamiyah is claimed to be an organisation with an ultimate goal of establishing a great Islamic state in Southeast Asia. As a result of the alleged Indonesian Muslim figures behind JI, the issue of JI in Indonesia has become the subject of wide debate. The Indonesian prominent figures are suspected of having leading roles in the organisation, and thus JI is presumably thought to exist in Indonesia. It was not until the end of 2003 that commentaries on the issue can be classified into having two approaches. The first approach sees that JI really exists in Indonesia, just as the second approach views that JI in Indonesia is only a fictitious organisation blown up by the political campaign  of  other  countries.  Both  approaches  have  their  own rationale, and thus they give rise to different consequences in terms of analysis of the alleged terrorist group, JI.

The  approach,  which  sees  that  JI  has  really  a  presence  in

Indonesia,  relates  the  emergence  of  JI  to  the  auspices  of  the

 

26 Ibid., p. 144.

27 Hefner, “Globalisation, Governance, and the Crisis,” p. 21.

28   As  quoted  in  “Sidney  Jones:  Hambali  Adalah  Petinggi  Al-Qaidah,”  Tempo  (3

November 2002), p. 53; “Jejak Ba’asyir di Sungai Manggis,” Tempo (3 November 2002),

p. 28.

 

 

Indonesian military. One of the proponents of this approach, Sidney Jones  says  that  JI  in  Indonesia,  which  is  allegedly responsible  for several terrorist acts in Southeast Asia, was established by the Indonesian military in the beginning of the 1970s. The establishment of this organisation, according to Sidney Jones, was mainly to accommodate the political interests of Muslims in the era of Soeharto, and at the same time to manipulate it as a ‘rubberstamp’ for labelling any Islamic movement fundamentalist groups. With this labelling, the government  had  a  reason  then,  as  indicated  by  Sidney  Jones,  to eradicate and combat the movements that allegedly bring a danger to the country.29

The evidence exploited by such an approach to convince the existence  of  JI  in  Indonesia  is  taken  from  the  District  court documents, from which the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” was found in Indonesia for the first time. As explicitly suggested by Sidney Jones, the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” did not appear until to be found in the court documents from the 1980s, one of the things is the Sleman District document under the title “Berkas Perkara Tersangka Abdullah Sungkar  [Case  Document  of  the  Alleged  Abdullah  Sungkar]”.30

However, according to Tempo, there is another court document found earlier than the document of Sungkar’s trial to support the claim of the presence of JI in Indonesia. This document is the Medan District

Court document of 1978 on charges of Gaos Taufik, the leader of Komando Jihad (Jihad Command), which states, as reported by Tempo, that Taufik had taken Abdullah Umar’s oath of loyalty to the JI in establishing a state based on Islamic law.31  From this evidence, it is clearly shown that the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” is acknowledged for the first time through the documents of the court, which  contain charges on the alleged figures of Islamic radicalism.

 

 

29 As quoted in “Jemaah Islamiyah Dibentuk oleh Militer Indonesia?,” 13 August 2002, available at: [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/08/13/20020813-055812.shtml] (Cited 06/11/02).

30  In this document, it is told the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” comes from Abdullah Sungkar. He used the term to call his organisation. Sungkar informed the court that as he received information from newspapers that the members of Jama’ah Islamiyah have been detained in Medan, he was certain to go to Pondok Ngruki for security reason. See Sidney Jones, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), pp. 5-6.

31 See “Diakah Sang Imam?,” p. 25.

 

 

A criticism has been directed, however, towards such an approach. The evidence to show the existence of JI solely through the court document without any sufficient investigation towards political atmosphere of the time is believed to be misleading. Supriyono, a senior journalist of the Indonesian daily newspaper, Republika, criticises such an approach, saying that the allegation of JI to exist in Indonesia based only upon the finding of the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” from the court document of the trial process of Abdullah Sungkar needs to be further investigated as the emergence of the term resulted only from the indictments of the prosecutor in later 1970s and early 1980s. Any reference to the political cases of Muslims at this period, according to Supriyono, must be carefully conducted with an analytically close and careful observation of the political relations of Islam and the state in which  the  New  Order  regime  conducted  very  strong   political repression on Muslims. Under this political repression, what to be the indictment of the prosecutor, as apparent in other cases, is likely to be also what to be the scenario of the state intelligence body. The trial of Abdullah Sungkar at this period went under this situation with the result that the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah”, as indicated by Supriyono, might appear in Sungkar’s confession under the direction of the intelligence body.32

Meanwhile, the approach, which views that JI in Indonesia is only

a fictitious organisation, relates the issue to the familiarity of its name and the political campaign of other countries. Some Indonesian commentators tend  to  follow this  approach,  maintaining that  as  a Muslim organisation, JI is not well acknowledged by Indonesians; most Indonesians having no prior knowledge of the existence of this organisation. Alfitra Salamm, a researcher from LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/Indonesian Institute of Science), for example, states that JI is not a real, but only a fictitious organisation set up by Malaysia and Singapore governments to silence the criticism of Islamic radical groups in their respective countries.33

 

 

32  As quoted in Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI), “Liputan Media Tentang Bali: Mana Jurnalisme Mana Propaganda?,” (Seminar Proceeding by ISAI and Majalah Pantau, Jakarta, 7-8 November 2002).

33  As quoted in “Peneliti LIPI: JI Organisasi Maya Buatan Malaysia dan Singapura,”

Detikcom, available at: [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/10/30/20021030-0654-

21.shtml] (Cited in 06/11/02); “Jamaah Islamiyah yang Cuma Bualan,” Forum Keadilan,

No. 3 (10 November 2002): p. 16

 

 

Certainly, if the parameter used to relate the organisation of JI in Southeast Asia to Indonesian figures is only based on the government claims and the confession of detainees, several Indonesian figures are the  subjects  of  such  allegations.  In  Malaysia,  for  example,  JI,  as reported by The Malay Mail, was claimed to be established by two Indonesian clerics, Ba’asyir and Riduan a.k.a. Isamuddin Hambali at the time of their status of exile in Malaysia. JI is allegedly to exist through the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), an organisation regarded, according to The Malay Mail, as the offshoot or the local branch of the JI, which had plans to establish a pan-Islamic state including Indonesia,  Singapore,  southern Philippines,  Malaysia,  and Brunei.34 The allegation of there being links between KMM and JI has also been made by the Singapore government. According to Fealy, like in Malaysia, officials in Singapore claimed there were links between the two organisations. This allegation was followed by the arrestment of several figures  in  the period  of  mid 2001  to  early 2002.35   All  the detainees, according to Internal Security Department (ISD) of Singapore, confessed that such four Indonesian Muslim figures as Ba’asyir, Hambali, Abu Jibril or Mohammad Iqbal bin Abdul Rahman, and Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana are their JI leaders.36

The public doubt about the existence of JI as a radical Islamic group in Indonesia has been decreased since the end of 2003. Since

then, the issue has been no longer about whether or not JI exists in Indonesia.  Rather,  public  debate  goes  to  an  issue  of  how  to deradicalise the communities, or how to secure people from radical ideas of Islam. This shift of public discourse is a result of the success of the police in proving allegations against Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and Ghufron as  the masterminds of the 2002 Bali Bombing. The public goes further to be less doubtful of the existence of JI in Indonesia following the execution of these three Bali bombers on 9

November 2008.

Another factor of the lessening of the public doubt about the existence of JI as a radical group in Indonesia is the actions by its

 

34  “Bali Bombings: Mastermind with Local Links,” The Malay Mail (19 November

2002), available at: [http://www.mmail.com.my/Current_News/MM/Monday/Front-

page/20021118094632] (Cited 19/11/02).

35 Fealy, “Is Indonesia a terrorist base?,” p. 1.

36  “Stemple JI dari Singapura,” Tempo (10 November 2002), p. 37; “Jejak Ba’asyir di

Sungai Manggis,” Tempo (3 November 2002), p. 30.

 

 

activists which have manifested in different ways. Their actions are varied from physical to ideological, which eventually show their energetic activism in the public. As elaborated below, the activists of this radical group have implemented different strategies in sending their messages to the general public audience, from physical attacks to publication, and then from publication to another kind of physical action. The media widely covered what the activists of this radical group have conducted in their presence in the public sphere. As a consequence, public attention has been bombarded with the energetic activism of the proponents of this radical group along with other wings of the radical Muslims. The actions of the radical Muslim activists have, in due course, attracted public attention.

Even though  the  number of  radical  Muslims remains  small  in

Indonesia  compared  to  that  of  moderate  Muslims,  the  popular

perception about their way of distributing their messages through physical actions needs a thorough analysis. This is because people, as a recent survey reported by Kompas suggests, do not intend to be entirely opposed to radical Muslims’ actions. The survey is so illustrative as follows:

 

Table 1: Perception of Terrorism

 

Items of Perception                                                                       %

Supporting suicide bombing as part of jihad                                     18.1%

Favouring Amrozi’s and Samudera’s way of physical action as a required jihad

Agreeing, Osama-led al-Qaedah’s strategies against US need full

supports

Agreeing for physical attacks against the Kuffar for da’wah

purposes

6.7%

 

59.1%

 

30.5%

Source : a  research  presented  by  Nasaruddin Umar  (Director General of Guidance for Muslims, MORA), to the Conference on Counter- Terrorism in Nusa Dua, Bali, as quoted in “Penanggulangan Terorisme: Mulailah dari Komunitas Terkecil,” Kompas (22 October

2010).

Such a range of perception seems to result particularly from strategies developed by the activists of radical Muslim groups. What has been conducted by JI activists need to be the case of analysis in grasping a better sense of the diverse strategies of these groups. Activists from these groups develop different strategies, from physical action to publication, and from publication to another physical action. These  strategies  add  new  types  to  a  common  strategy  previously

 

 

developed from oral preaching to physical action. The following subsection particularly discusses two strategies, from physical action to publication, and from publication to another physical action.

 

Ar   Rahmah   Media   Network:   From   Physical   Action   to

Publication

Jihadmagz is a bimonthly Islamic magazine established by Ar Rahmah Media Network, based initially in Pamulang and currently in Bintaro,  Tangerang,  Banten.  Owned  and  managed  by  Muhammad Jibriel Abdul Rahman (more popularly known as Jibriel), Ar Rahmah Media Network is itself a publishing house with a huge production of jihad-oriented publications. It produces these publications in an active way in Indonesia so that people can easily find its products, from pamphlets, books, video CDs, to magazines, in the market. Its success in producing jihad-oriented publications has inspired other publishing houses, such as Muqowama and Bumi Karya Media, to follow its example.37

Jihadmagz  was  first  launched  on  1  March  2008  during  the  7th

Islamic Book Fair in Istora Senayan, Jakarta. It was launched by two leading  jihad  activists  in  Indonesia  and  the  wider  Southeast  Asia region, Ba’asyir and Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin (more popularly known as “Abu Jibriel”). Ba’asyir was himself previously the amir or top leader of the MMI and recently the amir of Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (literally “the community of defenders of Islamic theology”). As his name indicates, Abu Jibriel is, in reality, the father  of  Jibriel,  the  owner  as  well  as  executive  director  of  the magazine.

Jihadmagz is an attractively printed Islamic magazine which pays special attention to the raising of the issue of jihad among local communities in Indonesia. It is second to none amongst Islamic magazines  specialising  in  the  dissemination  of  jihad  ideas  with  its strong accentuation and orientation towards the raising of Muslims’ religious-ideological awareness of waging physical war against the West and the infidels. The wording of the advertisement for its launching

even claimed that it was “the first jihad magazine in the world”.

 

 

 

37 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia Report

No.147/28 February 2008 (Jakarta & Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008), p.

10.

 

 

Some comparison can be made between Jihadmagz with other Islamic magazines with a similar ideological bent such as Khilafah Magazine (more commonly referred to as K-Mag) and An-Najah. K-Mag is published by the Bogor-based Pustaka Thariqul ‘Izzah. An-Najah is published by the Solo-based Forum Studi Islam An-Najah (An-Najah Forum for Islamic Studies). In the eyes of these latter two magazines, the idea of jihad does not refer to the sense of physical jihad or physical war against the West and the infidels. Jihadmagz, however, strongly and staunchly promotes these ideas, as elaborated below.38

The establishment of Jihadmagz marks a new trend in public expression among the Islamic jihadist movement in Indonesia, from

physical actions on the ground to publications. In the past, jihad activists  had  long  been  concerned  with  involving  themselves  in physical action against Westerners and non-believers. The Ambon conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in the period 1999-2002 was an example of involvement in jihad activism, which was later reproduced in the forms of a video CD. Recently, they reoriented their activism from physical action on the ground of conflict areas to print publication. This reorientation is due partly to the anti-terrorism campaign conducted energetically by the government. The production of Jihadmagz is a striking example of this reorientation.

The phenomenon of the growing interest among jihad activists in

print publication can be taken as another kind of obvious evidence to support the argument that print publication has a comparative advantage  in  constructing  a  certain  ideological  belief  among  the people. Through print publication, people not only can discover ideas and views of Islam, but also can reflect upon their meanings. This opportunity for reflection allows people not only to have a better grasp of Islamic ideas or views, but also to obtain a deep understanding of both emotional and doctrinal aspects of those Islamic ideas or views. So, the interplay between print publication and consumers works well. Print publication extends itself to attract not only  its own captive audience but also the non-captive audience. It is one reason that print publication not only accommodates the market but also creates a new market or audience.

 

 

38 It is in this strong and steadfast sense of jihad that the claim made by ICG that there were already several jihad magazines preceding Jihadmagz in Indonesia, including An- Najah, is baseless. For more information about the ICG’s claim, see International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing, p. 10.

 

 

The concept of “jihad media” promoted by Ar Rahmah Media Network and exemplified by Jihadmagz cannot be separated from the activism of Jibriel himself (b. 1984). Jibriel is the oldest of the eleven children of Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin alias “Abu Jibriel”. Abu Jibriel is himself a prominent jihad activist who lived for many years in Malaysia with other da`wah and jihad activists such as Abdullah Sungkar and Ba’asyir.39

Jibriel’s   partnership   with   Agus   Suhendra   and   M.   Fachry contributed  to  the  further  development  of  Jihadmagz  and  other products of so-called “jihad media” by Ar Rahmah Media Network. Suhendra  was  working  for  a  distributing  company  of  Hollywood movies based in the Mangga Dua Complex, Central Jakarta. Fachry was a senior editor of the well-established Islamic book publishing house   with   a   strict-conservative   ideology,   GIP.   Jibriel   gained

knowledge relating to marketing, circulating, and distributing the products of jihad media from Suhendra. Likewise, he obtained similar knowledge of editorship matters from Fachry. In organising Ar Rahma Media Network in general and Jihadmagz in particular, Jibriel serves as the idea creator in addition to his capacity as the owner and as the executive director, just as Suhendra and Fachry are respectively the marketing manager and editor-in-chief.40

The establishment and early operation of Jihadmagz resulted initially

from self-funding in the sense of personal financing by Jibriel’s family, and was later supported by financial sources with no usury principles. As Jibriel points out, the financial source for the establishment and initial operation of Jihadmagz was his father, Abu Jibriel. The so-called “social trust” Jibriel obtained from the printing company and his Ar Rahmah crews, allowing for delayed payment for production cost and job salary, is another kind of so-called “initial capital”. Jihadmagz also took much advantage of other financial sources. Since it considers usury  as  haram  (legally  unjustifiable),  the  magazine  made  use  of financial support from individuals in Jakarta as the additional capital under  the  economic  model  of  mudarabah  (“profit-sharing”).41   So,

 

39 Ibid., p. 10.

40  Interviews with Jibriel, Istora Senayan, Jakarta, 04 March 2008; Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008.

41  Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008. By definition, mudarabah is a principle or an arrangement for a business contract between two parties, the first as the investor (sahib al-mal) and the other as the entrepreneur (mudarib), which

 

 

Jihadmagz relied more on individual rather than institutional sources such as banks for supporting its operation.

Jihadmagz  is  oriented  to  middle-class  consumers,  allowing  for greater impact. The reason, according to the magazine, is that the middle class has an important role in leading change. By segmenting this market level, the ideas of jihad can be more easily disseminated and imparted to society.42  For this reason, production of Jihadmagz is exclusive. The magazine is produced in full colour and hard paper. It sells at an expensive price, Rp. 45,000, in comparison to other well- established news magazines such as Tempo which sells for Rp. 22,500.

For  marketing  purposes,  the  exploitation  of  jihad  ideas  and

practices  as  materials  for  publication  by  Jihadmagz  is  not  without reason.  Especially  during  the  global  campaign  against  (Islamic) terrorism and the jihadist movement, people around the world kept an eye on the jihad movement in every single part of the globe. Indonesia was no exception. Especially following Bali Bombing I which killed no less than 202 people and injured hundreds of others, the Bali Bombing II (1 October 2005) with 23 dead and 196 injured, and the Kuningan Bombing in Jakarta (9 September 2004) which killed 9 people and injured more than 100 others, some repressive political measures by the government have been taken against the militant da`wah-cum-jihad movement across Indonesia. These repressive political measures have been actively conducted under the auspices or supports of foreign governments such as those of Australia and the US.43

Under such a difficult situation, not only did those militant da`wah-

cum-jihad activists modify and diversify their activities into various forms such as publications, but other Muslims, especially harakah activists, also started to seek for more information about the “fundamentalist-militant-jihadist-hardliner” Islamic movement. As a result,    an    Islamic    magazine    publication    focusing    on    this

“fundamentalist-militant-jihadist-hardliner” Islamic ideology began to emerge and attract popular attention. Jihadmagz captured this situation as the potential market for its publications. It appears consistent with,

 

requires profit and loss sharing to be determined during the agreement of the contract. For more information, see Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), pp. 320-328.

42 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008.

43  See, for example, AusAID, Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid (Canberra: AusAID/Australian Government, 2003), especially p. 6.

 

 

and committed to, the production and dissemination of this Islamic ideology within its publications throughout this time.

In the market, in fact, Jihadmagz performs quite well. The first issue in March 2008, for example, was produced in 5,000 copies, but sold within less than two months 4,000 copies.44  As a newly established Islamic magazine in a period of increasingly tight market competition, Jihadmagz can be regarded as highly saleable. In comparison, Madina, a Jakarta-based   Islamic   magazine   established   a   year   earlier   than Jihadmagz, is printed in as many as six to eight thousand copies per issue, but sells on an average only 35 percent of the whole volume of production for each edition.45  Even though it is a newly established magazine, Jihadmagz has performed well with high saleability in the market.

 

Renewal Strategy: From Publication to another Physical Action

Another reorientation of public expressions by radical Muslims emerges   when   they   feel   confident   enough   with   their   own organisational plans. This reorientation leads them to shift from the making use of publication as a means of their meaning-making and message-producing to another kind of physical action. This shift of strategy seems to be implemented following the continuing consolidation among the activists of radical Muslim groups during the so-called “ceasefire” period where publication becomes a key instrument one the one hand, and as a response to the detaining of several radical Muslim activists on the other hand.

One of the most striking examples which can be taken as evidence

to mark the shift of strategy from publication to another physical action is the robbing of CIMB Niaga Bank in Medan on 18 August

2010. This rob action has fuelled the war against the radical Muslim activists by the police. Attempts by the police to chase the culprits of the bank rob has been undertaken in areas in Sumatra ranging from Medan to other provinces, and even to other provinces including Java. From the perspective of the police investigation, several figures alleged to have been responsible for the bank rob in question are activists

having close relationship with JI-affiliated individuals. Some, in the eyes to the police, are part of the terorism network with a number of jihadist training experiences held in Aceh and West Java. They are

 

44 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008.

45 Correspondence with Ade Armando, the editor-in-chief of Madina, 15 July 2008.

 

 

under the coordination of Mustofa (better known as Abu Tholut). Abu Tholut was himself put in jail for four years and half long for terrorism acts. After his release, he was believed by the police to be involved again in the fields of terrorism. He was then captured by anti-terrorism police force of Densus 88 in Kudus, Central Java, on 10 December

2010 for being suspected to have a connection to the perpetrators of the CIMB Niaga Bank robbers in Medan.

Such a reorientation from publication to another kind of physical

action  adds  another  kind  to  the  strategies  developed  by  radical Muslims in contemporary period in Indonesia. As suggested earlier, in the  past,  jihad  activists  had  long  been  concerned  with  involving

themselves in physical action against Westerners and non-believers. In other words, physical action represents the early strategy exploited in their public expression. In later development, jihad activists made use of  publication  as  an  additional  means  for  meaning-making  and message-producing.

The phenomenon of the growing interest among jihad activists in

shifting the strategy from publication to another physical action can be taken as another kind of obvious evidence to support the argument that Islamic radicalism is not a make-up story. The using of diverse strategies is just to show that they exist among communities. These different strategies just follow the growing socio-political situation of

the country and the maturity of the consolidation results among the radical jihadist activists.

 

Conclusion

The phenomenon of Islamic radicalism has been quite prominent in  the  regional  development  of  Southeast  Asia,  particularly  in Indonesia.  As  a  result,  Indonesia  turns  to  be  the  subject  of  the allegation of the hotbed of radicalism and terrorism. Four factors have contributed to the rise of Islamic radicalism In Indonesia, including the regime’s political repression, crucial socio-economic deprivation, globalisation, and the so-called “Arabia” support. Also, in this country Islamic radicalism appears in connection to two main roots: national roots tracing back to the previous Islamic movement and party in the early history of Indonesia, and transnational networks referring to a number of recent transnational Islamic links as the sponsor groups.

The diverse strategies developed by activists of Muslims radical groups contribute to the expansion of ideas distribution to wider audience. The reason is that people are given more opportunity to

 

 

reflect upon the meaning of the action conducted by activists of radical Muslim groups, either through publication or physical action. As a result, even though their involvement in physical attacks against other people remains a public concern, popular Muslims’ perception about the activism of radical Muslims do not entirely tend to be in opposition to the deadly physical attacks most likely conducted by jihad activists. This kind of perception can be assumed to be a consequence of the energetic activism of those radical Muslims exploiting such different strategies.

Such a kind of public perception proves to have led to the shift of popular understanding about Islamic radicalism from the doubt of the

existence of one of its wings, JI, to the increasingly positive responses towards the struggles of radical Muslims. Rather than maintaining their doubt of the existence of JI, people start to formulate their ideas to deal with the struggles of Islamic radicalism. The bombardment of information  and  messages  through  such  different  strategies (publication and physical action) has imparted a message to the public that  JI,  and  other  radical  Muslim  groups,  has  attracted  popular attention, and hence becomes a popular concern. Global geopolitics and the increasing conservative understanding of Islamic doctrines of jihad pose a new subject of study, and therefore deserve a thorough analysis in order to get a better comprehension of such a growing public perception. Kinds of research on these two issues appear to be significant to undertake.

 

References

 

Books and Articles

 

AusAID. Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid. Canberra: AusAID/Australian Government, 2003.

Barton, Greg. “Islamism and Indonesia: Islam and the Contest for

Power after Soeharto.” The Review (September 2002), p. 2.

Bruinessen, Martin van. “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-

Soeharto Indonesia.” South East Asia Research, no. 2, vol. 10 (July

2002): 117-154.

Hefner, Robert W. “Globalisation, Governance, and the Crisis of Indonesian Islam.” Unpublished paper presented to the Conference on Globalisation, State Capacity, and Muslim Self

 

 

Determination, Center for Global, International, and Regional

Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, 7-9 March 2002.

Huang, Reyko. “Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response.”

Terrorism Project, 8 February 2002.

Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI). “Liputan Media Tentang Bali: Mana Jurnalisme Mana Propaganda?.” Seminar Proceeding by ISAI and Majalah Pantau, Jakarta, 7-8 November 2002.

International  Crisis  Group,   Indonesia:  Jemaah  Islamiyah’s  Publishing Industry, Asia Report No.147/28 February 2008. Jakarta & Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008.

----------. Indonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 10 October 2002.

Jones,  Sidney.  Al-Qaeda  in  Southeast  Asia:  The  Case  of  the  “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002.

Muhammad Ayub. Understanding Islamic Finance. Hoboken: John Wiley

& Sons, 2007.

Ramakrishna,  Kumar.  “Jemaah  Islamiah:  Aims,  Motivations  and

Possible Counter-Strategies.” Perspective (October 2002).

Zada, Khamami. Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002).

 

Newspapers

 

“Confession of an al-Qaeda Terrorist.” Time Magazine, 23 September

2002.

“Jamaah Islamiyah  yang  Cuma Bualan.”  Forum  Keadilan, No.  3  (10

November 2002), p. 16.

“Sidney   Jones:   Hambali   Adalah   Petinggi   Al-Qaidah.”   Tempo   (3

November 2002), pp. 52-54.

Azra,  Azyumardi  “Agama  dan  Otentisitas  Islam.”  Republika,  25

October 2002.

Zada, Khamami. “Terorisme dan Radikalisme Agama.” Media Indonesia,

18 Oktober 2002.

“Diakah Sang Imam?.” Tempo 3 November 2002, p. 25.

 

 

“Jejak Ba’asyir di Sungai Manggis.” Tempo (3 November 2002): pp. 28-

30.

“Stemple JI dari Singapura.” Tempo, (10 November 2002), p. 37.

 

Internet Sources

 

“Bali Bombings: Mastermind with Local Links.” The Malay Mail (19

November  2002),  available  at:  [http://www.mmail.com.my/ Current_News/MM/Monday/Frontpage/20021118094632] (Cited 19/11/02).

“Jemaah Islamiyah Dibentuk oleh Militer Indonesia?.” 13 August 2002,

available   at:   [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/08/13/

20020813-055812.shtml] (Cited in 06/11/02).

“Peneliti LIPI: JI Organisasi Maya Buatan Malaysia dan Singapura.”

Detikcom, available at: [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/

10/30/20021030-065421.shtml] (Cited in 06/11/02).

Fealy, Greg. “Inside the Laskar Jihad: An Interview with the Leader of a  New,  Radical  and  Militant  Sect.”  Inside  Indonesia  (January- March 2001), available at: http://www. insideindonesia.org/ edit65/fealy.htm (Cited in 15/04/02).

Greg Fealy, “Is Indonesia a terrorist base?.” Inside Indonesia (July- September 2002), available at: http://www.insideindonesia.org/ edit71/fealy1.htm (Cited 19 November 2002).

Hasan, Noorhaidi. “Islamic Radicalism and the Crisis of the Nation- State.”      Available      at:       http//www.isim.nl/newsletter/7/ regional/1.html (Cited 14/11/02).

Marshall, Paul. “Terror’s Not New to Indonesia.” Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom House (15 October 2002). Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/country/indonesia/Te

 r r or ’s% 20Not % 20New% to% 20I ndones ia.htm                   (Cited

14/11/02).

 

Interviews and Correspondences

 

Correspondence with Ade Armando, the editor-in-chief of Madina, 15

July 2008.

Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008. Interview with Jibriel, Istora Senayan, Jakarta, 04 March 2008.