THE ROOTS, STRATEGIES, AND POPULAR PERCEPTION OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN INDONESIA1
Introduction
Southeast Asian Islam has recently
been exposed to a
problem of Islamic radicalism. Within the Southeast Asia region, the issue of
Islamic radicalism has been given a wide
coverage
by media. A large percentage of the Muslim population of the world lives in this region,
and
thus Islamic radicalism is an issue
of immense significance
in the region.
Certainly, al-Qaeda, which
is regarded
as the number one Islamic
terrorist group in the world, is not based in the region. However,
it has been suggested that al-Qaeda has
links with other radical groups
in the region —groups
said to be responsible for the
1 The earlier version of
this
paper was first presented to the international conference
“Tolerance and Intolerance: Rethinking Interfaith Relation in Indonesia” organsied by
Sekolah Tinggi Agama
Islam Negeri (STAIN, State Islamic College) Tulungagung in
Tulungangung -
Indonesia, 20
November 2010.
bomb attacks in the Philippines, Singapore,
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Since Islamic
radicalism has drawn
the
attention of the world,
Southeast Asian Islam also
becomes a subject of scholarly
discussion.
This paper examines Islamic radicalism particularly in Indonesia
in terms of its roots and
strategies of action. While focusing on the Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI, lit. “Islamic Community”) as the larger subject of discussion, it takes Ar Rahmah Media Network with its print
publication of Jihad Magazine (Jihadmagz) in particular as the case of study.
The
paper argues that the
emergence of Islamic radicalism is mainly
triggered by the combination of the
ruling regime’s political repression, crucial socio-economic deprivation, globalisation, and
Arabia support. Also, it further argues that there is a
shift of strategies among activists of radical Muslims in delivering their messages as well
as
in conducting their radical actions.
To begin with, the
paper explores the
roots of Islamic radicalism
in Indonesia. In what follows, it discusses
the shift of
local people’s perception of Islamic
radicalism.
Central to the discussion of this shift
are
the popular responses towards Islamic
radicalism,
particularly the issue
of the existence of JI in Indonesia
and the radical, violent actions by activists of this group.
At
the end, the paper investigates the diverse strategies
the activists of radical Muslims shift from
one
time
to
another in delivering their
messages to wider audience.
The paper argues that Islamic
radicalism is not a
make-up story in
Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. In an earlier phase, it
further argues,
local people of
the country split
into diverse kinds of perception about Islamic radicalism. One striking perception was the doubt
of the existence of radical Muslim groups, particularly
JI. The
success of the police in chasing
the perpetrators of violent actions
has then reduced
the popular doubt, and made
popular
perception changed from doubt to
how to save people
from radical ideas of Islam. Despite this, in later development,
the public gives an “excuse” to
Islamic
radicalism,
some by responding to it in a fairly positive way. This later public response is partly a result of the diverse strategies of
Islamic
radical groups in delivering their messages to the public, consisting
of physical action and publication.
The Roots of Islamic Radicalism
Islamic radicalism has strongly colored the picture of Islam in contemporary Indonesia. The face of Indonesian Islam is identified with
some
radical Muslims-based groups, such as Front Pembela Islam
(FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI,
Indonesian Mujahidin Council), Laskar Jihad (LJ, Jihad Paramilitary
Troops), and Jama’ah Ikhwan al-Muslimun Indonesia
(JAMI, Indonesian Ikhwan al-Muslimun
Community). Even though
Islamic
radical groups do not have significant number in comparison with moderate ones, such as Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU, The Awakening of
Muslim
Scholars) and Muhammadiyah, they can draw the popular attention.2 These groups are prominent
in
the
contemporary
Indonesian Islam for their literal religious understanding and radical
actions.
There are a lot of examples to show the radical actions of such
groups. FPI has been involved in a
number of raids and destruction of several
cafés, discotheques, night clubs, gambling dens, and other socially
“bad places”, just as LJ has had
an
intimate connection to the jihadist actions in Maluku,
Ambon and Poso of Central Sulawesi. In
these conflicting areas,
LJ has sent its militias
to fight
against Christians. Meanwhile, the Amir Majlis (the
leader
of
the
advisory
board) of MMI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is
believed by such groups as
Washington-based magazine, Time in its edition “Confession of an al- Qaeda
Terrorist”,3 Lee Kuan Yew in his address at the Conference on Asia Security
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,4 and above all by the US
Bush administration, to be leading JI,
a Muslim group
believed to have networks throughout
Southeast Asia, in particular Singapore and Malaysia, and to be allegedly
linked to Al-
Qaeda.
Much attention has been given to such Islamic radical groups. While MMI with Ba’asyir as its leader, as described by Huang,5 is allegedly responsible for
the unsolved bombings
in several places of Indonesia and
the
Philippines,
LJ
is
believed to have
played a significant role in the worsening of religious conflicts in several areas
of Indonesia. Some commentators differently discern the involvement of LJ in such conflicts. Fealy notes that the sending
of the Laskar
2 Azyumardi
Azra, “Agama
dan
Otentisitas Islam,” Republika, 25
October 2002.
3 See “Confession
of an al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time Magazine, 23 September 2002.
4 Sidney Jones, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia
(Jakarta/Brussels: International
Crisis Group, 2002), p. 2.
5 Reyko Huang, “Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response,”
Terrorism
Project, 8 February 2002, p. 1.
militias to the areas of conflict, particularly in Maluku, resulted from
the low capacity of the state to end the
conflict and from the finding suggesting
that Muslims were to
be driven
out from the
areas as Protestant churches had
plans to build Christian state consisting of Maluku,
West Papua and North Sulawesi.6 Unlike Fealy, Marshall
regards LJ as
the responsible for
the aggravation
of
the conflicts. According to Marshall, LJ is the cause of the deterioration of the
conflicts as the
coming of LJ militias in Maluku
and
Sulawesi hindered the attempts
of reconciliation between the
conflicting groups. Marshall
also points out that LJ had plans to drive out all Christians and to
establish
an extreme version
of Islamic law, particularly in
Sulawesi.7
Such reported cases of Islamic radicalism might send a significant
message that
religious radicalism is frequently followed by violent actions. There is a
parallel connection between religious radicalism and violence as the radicalism appears in the form of social
resistance in
accordance to its own religious understanding. There are, at least, three
general
tendencies of the
radicalism. First, radicalism is perceived
as
a response towards the existing conditions, including
assumption, idea,
value, and institution regarded as deviant. Second, radicalism is not restricted to the
form
of such resistance, but
also accompanied by an attempt to change
the existing order with another one supposed
to be better. Third, radicalism
is equipped with a strong belief in a certain
ideology and program, which can result in emotional
reaction and violence.8
Even though Islamic
radicalism becomes a
picture of
contemporary Indonesian Islam, some
commentators, while tending to come
to the agreement that such Islamic radicalism is a new
phenomenon for Indonesia, relate the phenomenon to
the crisis suffered by the country. According to Hasan, Islamic
radicalism,
as a new phenomenon in Indonesia, is inseparable
from the so-called multi-
6 Greg Fealy, “Inside
the Laskar Jihad: An
Interview
with the Leader of
a New, Radical
and
Militant Sect,” Inside Indonesia (January-March
2001), available at: http://www. insideindonesia.org/edit65/fealy.htm (Cited 15/04/02).
7 Paul Marshall, “Terror’s Not New to Indonesia,” Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom
House (15 October 2002). Available
at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/-
cou
ntry/ ind onesi a/ Terror’ s% 20N ot% 20New%t
o%
20I nd onesia .htm
] (Cited
in
14/11/02).
8 Khamami Zada, “Terorisme dan Radikalisme Agama,” Media Indonesia, 18 Oktober
2002.
dimensional crisis befalling the country since it started emerging in
1997 when Soeharto’s
regime was coming to the collapse. It seems to
Hasan that Islamic radicalism had its moments when the country felt in the overwhelming crisis.9 In addition, Zada
maintains that the fall of Soeharto
provides Islamic radicalism with invaluable moments to accelerate its movement.10 The change of political leadership
in
Indonesia is likely to bring about the emergence of the alternative ideology
in place of the previous one, and the ideology
which seems to
be more accurate to cover the movement of some contemporary Indonesian Muslims, according to Barton, is Islamism. The ideology which
believes Islam can
and
should form the basis of political ideology, in Barton’s view,11 can be the beginning of Islamic radicalism.
Certainly, the post-Soeharto era
with its unsolved crises became a
worthy
moment
for
the
emergence of Islamic radicalism.
The
phenomenon of Islamic radicalism became
more
visible in the post- Soeharto
era as the wide coverage of media towards their actions made their movements more influential. Van Bruinessen, while depicting
Islamic
radicalism as one of the most conspicuous new phenomena in
contemporary
Indonesian Islam, suggests that such Islamic radical
groups had much power against the state authority
at
the time of the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. He gives an example that they
often gained control of the
streets under the unwillingness of the army
and police to restrain them.12
Such analyses on the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia play an important role in looking
at
the wider phenomena of Islamic
radicalism
across Southeast Asia as a whole,
especially when it has
been already found that some Islamic radicalism in the region have been
interconnected. Indonesia which has been noted for long time as being
occupied by Moderate Muslims, and
has the world’s largest Muslim population, is now repeatedly claimed by several groups as a
country with serious problems of Muslim terrorist and radical groups,
9 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamic Radicalism and the Crisis of the Nation-State,” Available
at: http//www.isim.nl/newsletter/7/regional/1.html (Cited in 14/11/02).
10 Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 88.
11 Greg Barton, “Islamism and Indonesia: Islam and the Contest for Power after
Soeharto,” The Review (September 2002), p.
2.
12 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies
of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto
Indonesia,” South East Asia Research,
no.
2, vol. 10 (July 2002): p. 118.
particularly in the aftermath
of bomb blast in sites such as Kuta Bali and Marriot Jakarta. As pointed out by Fealy,13 such countries as the US, Singapore and Malaysia claim to have
evidence of Indonesians leading
offshore terrorist groups or of terrorists being based in
Indonesia, and moreover, Singaporean senior minister Lee Kwan Yew,
as
indicated by Tempo,14 claimed that Indonesia
was
a ‘hotbed of terrorism’.
This
intensifies the significance of analysis of why people
become radicalised in the middle of
the changing socio-political and
economic situations within the
course of the
nation.
Some commentators have different opinions on the problem of why people become radical individuals. According to general view of
terrorism, as suggested by Ramakrishna,15 people become radicalised by a nexus of political repression and crucial socio-economic deprivation; or in other words, they become so if the government conducts repressive
measures towards the protests and aspirations of
the society while it fails to provide
them with, not to mention all, economic
growth, proper jobs, and affordable education. From this view, an understanding can be drawn that radicalism
results from two
key points: political suppression by the government and socio- economic downturn.
Such general view does not seem to be precisely the case in some
Southeast Asian countries, however. Even though political repression
and socio-economic
decline have been the raison d’tre for the Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia, there are other factors in the prevalence
of radicalism: globalisation and Arabia. Islamic radicalism in Southeast
Asia
emerges, while in
response to “political repression” and “poor governance”,
as
a result of the
global awareness of Muslims in the region
of the developments
in the Islamic world, which creates anti- American sentiment.
Globalisation can be depicted as having poured more
fuel on Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia as Muslims of the region become
aware
that the problems facing
the wider Islamic world resulting
from a biased
US
foreign policy,
while their national
13 Greg Fealy, “Is Indonesia a terrorist base?,” Inside Indonesia (July-September 2002), available at: http://www.insideindonesia.org/ edit71/fealy1.htm (Cited 19 November
2002).
14 “Diakah Sang Imam?,” Tempo (3 November
2002), p. 25.
15 Kumar Ramakrishna, “Jemaah Islamiah: Aims, Motivations and Possible Counter-
Strategies,” Perspective (October 2002), p. 1.
governments
have not done much
to
help change “Washington’s
policy mind-set”.
Thus, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is given rise by four major factors: political repression, poor governance, global
awareness, and Arabia. It is frequently argued, as reported
by International Crisis Group (ICG) in its “Indonesia Briefing” section, that the New Order
regime’s high suppression of political
Islam contributed to the
radicalisation of Muslim dissent.16 Moreover, the increase in Islamic
radicalism
is basically
the outcome of the government
failure to enforce
the law and to solve socio-religious conflicts and the result of
the abrupt decline of central
government authority.
Besides political struggle as well as poor governance as the roots, van Bruinessen adds that
the present Islamic radicalism in
Indonesia results also from
global awareness, which paves the way
for the establishment of transnational Islamic networks.17 In addition, Azra suggests that Islamic radicalism
in Indonesia is closely related to the role of some Arab descendent
figures in the groups of FPI, MMI, and LJ since they
tend to take rigid and
rigorous ways to
come to their goals instead of persuasive and
peaceful ones.18 Hefner admits that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has come
to its prominence with the significant contribution of financial assistance from Saudi
Arabian
authorities.19
Meanwhile,
in Singapore and
Malaysia, political repression
and
socio-economic
decline do not seem to be the
key factors of
the
Islamic
radicalism. This is not to say that political and socio-economic reasons
are
not the factors of Islamic radicalism in both countries, but
rather
that there is another factor to be more apparent for it.
Ramakrishna
maintains that the most important factor and very basic cause of Islamic radicalism,
as
represented
by JI extremism, in Singapore and
Malaysia are ideological, not socio-economic or political. All
the
31
JI detainees in
Singapore, according
to Ramakrishna, are not “the children of poverty and despair”, but they
16 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 10
October
2002),
p.
3.
17 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of
Islamic Radicalism,” p. 118.
18 Azra, “Agama dan Otentisitas Islam.”
19 Robert W.
Hefner, “Globalisation,
Governance, and
the
Crisis of
Indonesian Islam,” (Unpublished paper presented to the
Conference on Globalisation, State
Capacity, and Muslim Self Determination, Center for Global, International, and
Regional Studies, University of
California-Santa Cruz, 7-9 March
2002), p. 24.
are “gainfully employed” and own their homes encompassing HDB
five-room or executive flats.
In
the matter of non-socio-economic and
political factors of the Islamic radicalism in Malaysia, the roots can be traced to
the background of its activists. Ramakrishna indicates that
several leading activists of Islamic radical groups are
the principals of schools, graduates and lecturers of universities.20 These kinds of job
positions suggest a gainful
employment, and show that
the members of Islamic radicalism, who
hold these job positions, occupy an
upper level in the community in terms of the
socio-economic
status.
From the phenomenon of the Islamic radicalism
in Indonesia, there is one significant feature that Islamic radicalism does not appear
from zero point or without
any affiliation to the
others. Van
Bruinessen maintains
that Islamic radical groups in Indonesia
can
be traced to two roots: national
and
transnational networks.21 While national network refers to two relatively “indigenous” previous Muslim
political movements,
the Darul Islam (DI)
movement
and the Masyumi Party, transnational network
relates to a number
of such more recent transnational Islamic links as the sponsor groups, which
are identified by van Bruinessen22 with Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Pakistan.
From such a perspective, the DI movement and the Masyumi
Party have
inspired
the
activists
of
current Islamic Radicalism
in
Indonesia, and
thus
have occupied
a
certain
place in their hearts. Having been ordered to dissolve
itself in early
1960s, according to van Bruinessen23 and ICG,24 Masyumi transformed its political struggle
then into, one of the things, the missionary
efforts among Indonesian
Muslims under the name
of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia
(DDII, the Indonesian Dakwah
Council) in 1967. The two prominent figures, which are claimed to be
leading JI, Ba’asyir and Sungkar, are indicated by van Bruinessen to be well connected to DDII circles.25
Van Bruinessen also indicates that one of the most active Islamic
radical groups, MMI, in which Ba’asyir used to occupy the position of
20 Ramakrishna, “Jemaah Islamiah,” pp. 1-3.
21 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic
Radicalism, p. 118.
22 Ibid., p. 149.
23 Ibid., p. 122.
24 International
Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims, p. 11.
25 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic
Radicalism, p. 129.
leadership, encompasses the sections of the DI movement of the foregoing decades.26 Hefner also points out that among those
in MMI organisation’s
rank are individuals associated with the DI group.27 The connection of the alleged terrorist
organisation,
JI,
to the DI movement, according to
Jones,28 has gained justification
from
the intimate relationship between Ba’asyir and Sungkar and Kadungga, a son in law of Kahar Muzakkar, the
leader of DI movement in South
Sulawesi.
In sum, globalisation has met with localisation (“glocalisation”)
to become two contributing
factors for Islamic
radicalism in Southeast Asia. Globalisation has raised the awareness of Muslims of the global
situation facing Islamic world. This awareness has generated Muslims’
reaction
to the existing situations they face, using lots of their possible religious and financial resources. This condition
has been devastated
by the reduced capacity of the state where Muslims stay in, coupled
with socio-economic downturn, to deal with radicalism
and
violation within the
country.
The Unresolved
Jama’ah Islamiyah as a Radical Group
Jama’ah Islamiyah
is claimed to be an organisation with an ultimate
goal of establishing a great Islamic state in Southeast Asia. As a result
of the alleged Indonesian Muslim figures behind JI, the issue
of JI in Indonesia has become the
subject of wide debate. The Indonesian
prominent figures are suspected of having leading roles in the
organisation, and
thus JI is presumably thought to
exist
in Indonesia. It was not until the end of 2003 that
commentaries on the issue can be classified
into having two approaches.
The first approach sees that
JI really exists in Indonesia, just as the second approach views that JI in Indonesia
is only a fictitious
organisation blown up by the political campaign
of other
countries.
Both approaches have
their
own rationale,
and
thus they give rise to different consequences in terms of
analysis of the alleged
terrorist group, JI.
The approach,
which
sees
that
JI has really a presence
in
Indonesia, relates
the
emergence of JI
to
the
auspices of the
26 Ibid., p. 144.
27 Hefner, “Globalisation, Governance, and the Crisis,” p. 21.
28 As quoted
in
“Sidney Jones:
Hambali
Adalah Petinggi
Al-Qaidah,” Tempo (3
November 2002), p. 53; “Jejak Ba’asyir di Sungai Manggis,” Tempo (3 November 2002),
p. 28.
Indonesian military. One of the proponents of this approach, Sidney Jones
says that
JI in Indonesia, which
is allegedly responsible for several
terrorist acts in Southeast
Asia, was established by the
Indonesian military in the beginning
of the 1970s. The establishment
of this organisation, according to Sidney Jones, was mainly to accommodate the political interests of Muslims in the era of Soeharto, and at the same time
to manipulate it as a ‘rubberstamp’ for labelling any
Islamic movement fundamentalist groups. With this labelling, the government had a
reason then,
as indicated
by Sidney
Jones, to eradicate and combat the movements that allegedly bring a danger to
the country.29
The evidence exploited by such an approach to convince the
existence
of JI
in
Indonesia is taken
from the District
court
documents, from which the term
“Jama’ah Islamiyah” was found in Indonesia for the first time. As explicitly suggested by Sidney Jones,
the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” did not appear until to be found
in the court documents from the
1980s, one
of the things is the Sleman District
document under the title “Berkas Perkara Tersangka Abdullah Sungkar [Case Document of the Alleged
Abdullah
Sungkar]”.30
However, according to Tempo, there is
another court document found
earlier than the document of Sungkar’s trial to support
the
claim of the presence of JI in Indonesia. This document is the Medan District
Court document of 1978 on charges of Gaos Taufik, the
leader of Komando Jihad (Jihad Command), which states, as reported by Tempo,
that Taufik had taken Abdullah Umar’s oath of
loyalty to the JI in establishing a state based on Islamic law.31 From this evidence, it is clearly
shown that the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” is acknowledged for the
first time through the documents of the court, which contain
charges on the alleged
figures of Islamic radicalism.
29 As quoted in “Jemaah
Islamiyah Dibentuk oleh Militer Indonesia?,” 13 August 2002,
available at: [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/08/13/20020813-055812.shtml] (Cited 06/11/02).
30 In this document, it is told the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” comes from Abdullah
Sungkar.
He used the
term to call his organisation.
Sungkar informed the
court that as
he
received information from newspapers
that the members of Jama’ah Islamiyah have been detained in Medan, he was certain to go to Pondok Ngruki for security reason. See Sidney Jones, Al-Qaeda in
Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group,
2002), pp. 5-6.
31 See “Diakah
Sang Imam?,” p. 25.
A criticism has been directed, however, towards such an approach.
The
evidence to show the existence
of JI solely through the court
document without
any sufficient investigation towards political atmosphere of the time is believed to be misleading. Supriyono, a senior journalist
of the Indonesian daily newspaper, Republika,
criticises
such an approach, saying that the allegation of JI to exist in Indonesia based only upon the finding of the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” from the
court
document of the trial
process of
Abdullah Sungkar
needs to be
further investigated as the emergence of the term resulted only from the indictments of the prosecutor in later 1970s and early 1980s. Any
reference
to the political cases of Muslims at this period, according to
Supriyono, must be carefully conducted with an analytically close and careful
observation of the political relations of Islam and the state in which the New
Order
regime conducted very strong
political repression on Muslims.
Under this political repression, what
to be
the indictment of the prosecutor, as apparent
in other cases, is likely to be
also
what to be the scenario of the state intelligence body. The trial of Abdullah Sungkar at this period went under this situation with the result
that the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah”, as indicated by Supriyono, might appear in Sungkar’s confession under the direction of the intelligence
body.32
Meanwhile, the approach, which views that JI in Indonesia
is only
a fictitious organisation, relates the issue to the familiarity of its name and
the political campaign of other countries. Some Indonesian
commentators tend
to follow
this approach, maintaining that
as a Muslim organisation, JI is not well acknowledged by Indonesians; most
Indonesians having no prior knowledge of the existence
of this organisation.
Alfitra Salamm, a researcher
from
LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/Indonesian Institute of Science),
for example,
states that JI is not a real, but only a
fictitious organisation set up by
Malaysia
and
Singapore governments to silence the criticism of Islamic radical
groups in their respective
countries.33
32 As quoted in Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI), “Liputan Media Tentang Bali: Mana Jurnalisme Mana
Propaganda?,” (Seminar Proceeding by ISAI and Majalah Pantau, Jakarta, 7-8 November
2002).
33 As quoted in “Peneliti LIPI: JI Organisasi Maya Buatan Malaysia dan Singapura,”
Detikcom, available at: [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/10/30/20021030-0654-
21.shtml] (Cited in 06/11/02); “Jamaah Islamiyah yang Cuma Bualan,” Forum Keadilan,
No. 3 (10 November
2002): p. 16
Certainly, if the parameter used to relate
the organisation of JI in
Southeast Asia
to Indonesian figures is only based on the government
claims and
the confession of detainees, several Indonesian figures are the
subjects of such
allegations. In Malaysia, for example, JI,
as reported
by The Malay Mail, was claimed to be established
by two Indonesian clerics, Ba’asyir and Riduan a.k.a. Isamuddin
Hambali at
the time of their status of exile in
Malaysia. JI is allegedly to exist
through the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), an organisation regarded,
according to The Malay Mail, as the offshoot or the local
branch of the JI, which had plans to establish a pan-Islamic state including Indonesia,
Singapore, southern
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.34 The allegation of there being links between
KMM and
JI
has also been made by the Singapore government. According
to Fealy, like
in Malaysia, officials in Singapore
claimed there
were links between the two organisations. This allegation was followed
by the arrestment of several figures in
the period of mid
2001 to early 2002.35 All the detainees, according to
Internal Security Department (ISD) of
Singapore, confessed
that such four Indonesian Muslim figures as Ba’asyir,
Hambali, Abu Jibril or Mohammad Iqbal bin Abdul Rahman, and
Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana
are their JI leaders.36
The public doubt about the existence of JI as a radical Islamic
group in Indonesia has been decreased since the end of 2003. Since
then, the issue has been no longer about whether or not JI exists in
Indonesia. Rather,
public debate goes
to
an issue of how to deradicalise the communities, or how to secure people from radical
ideas of Islam. This shift of public discourse is a result of the success
of the police in proving allegations
against Imam Samudra, Amrozi,
and
Ghufron as the masterminds of the 2002 Bali Bombing. The
public goes further to be less doubtful of the existence of JI in
Indonesia following the execution of these three Bali bombers on 9
November 2008.
Another factor of the lessening of the public
doubt about the existence of JI as a radical group in Indonesia is the actions by its
34 “Bali Bombings: Mastermind with Local Links,” The Malay Mail (19
November
2002), available at: [http://www.mmail.com.my/Current_News/MM/Monday/Front-
page/20021118094632] (Cited 19/11/02).
35 Fealy, “Is Indonesia a terrorist base?,” p. 1.
36 “Stemple JI dari Singapura,” Tempo (10 November 2002), p. 37; “Jejak Ba’asyir di
Sungai Manggis,” Tempo (3 November 2002), p. 30.
activists which have manifested
in different ways. Their actions are
varied from physical to ideological, which eventually show
their energetic activism in the public. As elaborated below, the activists of this
radical group have implemented different strategies in sending their messages to the general public audience, from physical attacks to
publication, and then from publication to another kind
of physical action. The media widely covered what the activists of this radical
group have conducted in their presence in the public sphere. As a consequence,
public attention has been bombarded with the energetic
activism of the proponents of this radical group along with
other wings
of the radical Muslims. The actions of the radical Muslim activists
have, in due course, attracted public attention.
Even though the
number of radical Muslims remains
small in
Indonesia compared to that of moderate Muslims, the popular
perception about their way of distributing their messages through physical actions needs a thorough
analysis. This is because people,
as
a recent survey reported by Kompas suggests, do not intend to be entirely
opposed to radical Muslims’ actions. The survey is so illustrative as
follows:
Table 1: Perception of Terrorism
Items of Perception
%
Supporting suicide bombing as
part of jihad 18.1%
Favouring Amrozi’s and Samudera’s way of physical action as a required jihad
Agreeing, Osama-led al-Qaedah’s strategies against US need full
supports
Agreeing for physical attacks against the Kuffar for
da’wah
purposes
6.7%
59.1%
30.5%
Source : a research presented by
Nasaruddin Umar
(Director General of Guidance for Muslims, MORA), to the Conference
on
Counter-
Terrorism
in Nusa Dua, Bali, as quoted in “Penanggulangan Terorisme: Mulailah dari Komunitas Terkecil,” Kompas (22
October
2010).
Such a range of
perception seems to result particularly from
strategies developed by the activists of radical Muslim groups. What
has been conducted by JI activists need to be
the case of analysis in
grasping a better sense of the diverse strategies of these groups.
Activists from these groups develop different strategies, from physical action
to publication, and from
publication to another physical action.
These strategies
add new
types to a common
strategy
previously
developed from oral preaching to physical action. The following subsection particularly discusses two strategies, from physical
action to publication, and from publication
to another physical action.
Ar Rahmah Media Network: From Physical Action to
Publication
Jihadmagz is a bimonthly Islamic magazine established
by Ar Rahmah Media Network,
based initially in Pamulang and currently in Bintaro,
Tangerang, Banten.
Owned and managed by Muhammad Jibriel Abdul
Rahman
(more popularly known as Jibriel), Ar Rahmah Media Network is itself a publishing house
with a huge production of
jihad-oriented publications. It produces these publications in an active
way in Indonesia so that people can easily find
its products, from pamphlets, books,
video CDs, to magazines, in the market. Its success
in producing jihad-oriented publications has inspired other publishing
houses, such as Muqowama
and
Bumi Karya Media, to follow its example.37
Jihadmagz was first
launched on 1 March 2008
during
the
7th
Islamic Book Fair in Istora Senayan,
Jakarta. It was launched by two
leading jihad activists in Indonesia and
the
wider
Southeast
Asia
region, Ba’asyir and Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin (more
popularly known as “Abu Jibriel”). Ba’asyir was himself
previously
the amir or top leader of the
MMI
and recently the amir of Jama’ah
Anshorut Tauhid (literally “the community
of defenders of Islamic theology”). As his name indicates, Abu Jibriel is, in reality, the father
of
Jibriel,
the
owner
as well
as executive
director of the magazine.
Jihadmagz is an attractively
printed Islamic magazine which pays special
attention to the raising
of the issue of jihad among local
communities in Indonesia. It is second to none amongst Islamic
magazines specialising
in
the dissemination of jihad ideas
with its strong accentuation
and orientation towards the raising
of Muslims’
religious-ideological
awareness of waging physical war against the West and the infidels. The wording of the advertisement for its launching
even claimed
that it was “the first jihad magazine in
the world”.
37 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia Report
No.147/28 February 2008 (Jakarta & Brussels: International Crisis Group,
2008), p.
10.
Some comparison can be made between Jihadmagz with other Islamic magazines with a
similar ideological
bent such as Khilafah Magazine (more commonly referred to as K-Mag) and An-Najah. K-Mag
is published by the Bogor-based
Pustaka Thariqul ‘Izzah. An-Najah is
published by the Solo-based Forum Studi Islam An-Najah (An-Najah Forum for Islamic
Studies). In the eyes of these latter two magazines, the idea of jihad does not refer to the sense of physical jihad or physical war against the West and the infidels. Jihadmagz,
however, strongly and staunchly promotes these ideas, as elaborated
below.38
The establishment of Jihadmagz marks a
new trend in public
expression among the Islamic jihadist movement in Indonesia, from
physical actions on the ground to publications. In the past, jihad activists had
long been concerned with involving themselves
in
physical action against
Westerners and
non-believers.
The
Ambon conflict between
Muslims and non-Muslims in the period 1999-2002
was
an example of
involvement in
jihad activism, which was later reproduced in the forms of a video CD. Recently, they
reoriented their activism from physical action on the
ground of conflict areas to print publication.
This
reorientation is due partly to the anti-terrorism
campaign conducted energetically
by the government. The production of
Jihadmagz is a striking
example
of this reorientation.
The phenomenon of the growing interest
among jihad activists in
print publication can be
taken as another kind of obvious evidence to support the argument
that print publication has a comparative advantage
in constructing a certain
ideological
belief
among the people.
Through print publication, people not only can discover ideas
and
views of Islam, but also can reflect upon their meanings.
This opportunity for reflection allows people not only to have a better
grasp of Islamic
ideas or views, but also to obtain a deep understanding
of both emotional and doctrinal aspects of those Islamic ideas or views.
So, the interplay between print publication and consumers works well. Print publication extends itself to attract not only
its own captive audience
but also the
non-captive audience. It is one reason that print
publication not only accommodates the market but also creates a new
market or audience.
38 It is in this strong and steadfast sense of jihad that the
claim made
by
ICG that there were
already
several
jihad magazines preceding Jihadmagz in
Indonesia, including An- Najah,
is baseless. For more information about the ICG’s claim, see International
Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing, p.
10.
The concept of “jihad media” promoted
by Ar Rahmah Media Network and exemplified by Jihadmagz cannot be
separated from the
activism of Jibriel himself (b. 1984). Jibriel
is the oldest of the eleven children of Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin alias “Abu Jibriel”. Abu Jibriel is himself a prominent jihad activist who
lived for many years in Malaysia with other da`wah and jihad activists
such
as Abdullah Sungkar and Ba’asyir.39
Jibriel’s partnership with Agus
Suhendra and M. Fachry
contributed to the further development of Jihadmagz and
other products of so-called “jihad media” by
Ar
Rahmah Media Network. Suhendra was
working for a
distributing company
of Hollywood
movies based in the Mangga Dua Complex, Central Jakarta. Fachry was a senior editor of the well-established
Islamic book publishing
house
with a
strict-conservative ideology, GIP. Jibriel gained
knowledge
relating to marketing, circulating, and distributing
the products of jihad
media from Suhendra. Likewise, he obtained similar knowledge of editorship matters from Fachry. In organising Ar Rahma Media Network in general and Jihadmagz in particular, Jibriel serves as the idea
creator in
addition to his capacity as the
owner and as the executive director, just as Suhendra and Fachry are respectively the marketing
manager and editor-in-chief.40
The establishment and early operation
of Jihadmagz resulted initially
from self-funding
in the sense of personal financing by
Jibriel’s family,
and was later supported by financial sources with no usury principles.
As
Jibriel points out, the financial source for the establishment and
initial operation of Jihadmagz
was his father, Abu Jibriel. The so-called “social trust” Jibriel
obtained from the printing
company and his Ar Rahmah crews, allowing for delayed payment for production cost and job salary,
is another kind
of so-called “initial
capital”. Jihadmagz also took
much advantage of other financial sources. Since it considers
usury
as haram (legally unjustifiable), the magazine made
use of financial
support from individuals
in Jakarta as the additional capital
under the economic model of mudarabah (“profit-sharing”).41 So,
39 Ibid., p.
10.
40 Interviews with Jibriel, Istora Senayan, Jakarta, 04 March 2008; Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April
2008.
41 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008. By definition,
mudarabah is
a principle
or
an arrangement for a
business
contract between
two parties, the first as the investor (sahib al-mal) and the other as the entrepreneur (mudarib), which
Jihadmagz relied more
on individual rather than institutional sources such as banks for supporting its
operation.
Jihadmagz is oriented to middle-class consumers, allowing for greater impact. The
reason, according
to the magazine, is that
the middle class has an important role in leading change. By segmenting
this market level, the ideas of jihad can be more easily disseminated
and
imparted to society.42 For this reason, production of Jihadmagz is exclusive. The magazine
is produced in full colour and hard paper. It sells at an expensive price, Rp. 45,000, in comparison to other well-
established
news magazines such
as Tempo which
sells for Rp. 22,500.
For marketing
purposes,
the
exploitation
of
jihad ideas
and
practices as
materials for publication
by
Jihadmagz is
not without
reason.
Especially
during the global campaign against
(Islamic) terrorism and the jihadist movement, people around the world kept an eye on the jihad movement in every single part of the globe. Indonesia was no exception. Especially following Bali
Bombing I which killed no
less
than 202 people and injured hundreds of others, the Bali Bombing II (1 October 2005) with 23 dead and 196
injured, and the Kuningan Bombing in Jakarta (9 September 2004) which killed 9
people and injured more than 100 others, some repressive political measures by the government have been taken against the militant da`wah-cum-jihad movement across Indonesia. These
repressive political measures have been actively conducted under the auspices or supports of foreign governments
such as those of Australia and the
US.43
Under such a difficult situation, not only did those militant da`wah-
cum-jihad activists modify and diversify their activities into various
forms such as publications, but other
Muslims, especially harakah activists, also started to seek for more information about the “fundamentalist-militant-jihadist-hardliner”
Islamic
movement. As a result, an Islamic
magazine
publication focusing
on
this
“fundamentalist-militant-jihadist-hardliner” Islamic ideology began to
emerge and attract popular attention. Jihadmagz captured this situation as the potential market for its publications. It appears consistent with,
requires
profit and loss sharing to be determined during the
agreement of
the contract. For
more information, see
Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (Hoboken:
John Wiley &
Sons, 2007), pp.
320-328.
42 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April
2008.
43 See, for example, AusAID, Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid (Canberra:
AusAID/Australian Government, 2003), especially p. 6.
and committed to, the production and
dissemination of this Islamic
ideology within its publications throughout this time.
In the market, in
fact, Jihadmagz performs quite well. The
first issue in March
2008,
for example,
was
produced in 5,000 copies, but sold
within less than two months 4,000 copies.44 As a newly established
Islamic magazine in a period of increasingly
tight market competition, Jihadmagz can be regarded as highly
saleable. In comparison, Madina, a Jakarta-based Islamic magazine
established a year earlier than Jihadmagz, is printed in as many as six to eight thousand copies per issue, but sells on an average only 35 percent of the whole volume of
production for each edition.45 Even though it is a newly established magazine, Jihadmagz has
performed well with high saleability
in the market.
Renewal Strategy: From Publication to another Physical Action
Another reorientation of public expressions by radical Muslims emerges when they
feel confident enough with their
own
organisational
plans. This reorientation
leads them to shift from the
making use of publication as a means of their meaning-making and message-producing
to another kind of physical
action. This shift of
strategy
seems to be implemented following the continuing
consolidation among the activists of radical Muslim
groups during the so-called “ceasefire” period where
publication becomes a key
instrument one
the one hand, and as a response
to the detaining of
several radical Muslim
activists on the other hand.
One of the most striking examples which can be taken as evidence
to mark the shift of strategy from publication to another physical
action is the robbing of CIMB Niaga Bank in Medan on 18 August
2010. This rob action has fuelled the war against the radical Muslim activists by the police. Attempts by the
police to chase the
culprits of the bank rob
has been undertaken in areas in Sumatra ranging from
Medan to other provinces,
and
even to other provinces including Java. From the perspective
of the police investigation, several figures alleged to have been responsible for the bank rob in question are activists
having close relationship with JI-affiliated individuals. Some, in the
eyes to the police, are part of the terorism network with a
number of jihadist training
experiences held in Aceh and West Java. They are
44 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25
April 2008.
45 Correspondence with Ade
Armando, the editor-in-chief
of Madina,
15 July 2008.
under the coordination
of Mustofa
(better known as Abu Tholut). Abu
Tholut was himself put
in jail for four years and
half long for terrorism
acts. After his release, he was believed by the police to be involved
again
in the fields of terrorism.
He was then captured by anti-terrorism police force of Densus 88 in Kudus,
Central Java, on 10 December
2010 for being suspected to have a connection to the perpetrators of the CIMB Niaga Bank robbers in Medan.
Such a reorientation from publication to another kind of physical
action adds
another
kind
to
the
strategies
developed by radical
Muslims in contemporary period in Indonesia. As suggested earlier, in
the past,
jihad activists had long been
concerned
with involving
themselves in physical action against Westerners and non-believers. In
other words,
physical action represents the
early
strategy
exploited in their public expression. In later development, jihad activists made use of publication
as an
additional
means for meaning-making
and message-producing.
The phenomenon of the growing interest
among jihad activists in
shifting the strategy from publication to another physical
action can be taken as another kind of obvious evidence to support the argument
that Islamic radicalism is not a make-up story. The using of diverse
strategies is just to show that they
exist among communities. These
different strategies just follow the growing socio-political situation of
the country and the maturity
of the consolidation results among the radical
jihadist activists.
Conclusion
The phenomenon of Islamic radicalism has been quite prominent
in the regional
development
of
Southeast
Asia, particularly
in
Indonesia. As
a
result, Indonesia turns
to
be the subject of the allegation
of the hotbed of radicalism and
terrorism. Four factors have contributed
to the rise of Islamic radicalism In
Indonesia, including the regime’s political repression, crucial
socio-economic deprivation,
globalisation,
and
the so-called “Arabia” support. Also, in
this country Islamic radicalism appears in connection to two main roots: national roots
tracing back to the previous Islamic movement and party in the early history of Indonesia, and transnational networks referring to
a number of recent transnational Islamic links as the sponsor groups.
The diverse strategies developed by activists of Muslims radical
groups contribute to the expansion of ideas distribution
to wider audience. The reason is that people are given more opportunity
to
reflect upon the
meaning of the action conducted by
activists of radical
Muslim
groups, either through publication or physical
action. As a result,
even though
their involvement in physical attacks against other people
remains a public concern, popular Muslims’ perception about the activism of radical
Muslims do not entirely tend to
be in opposition to the deadly physical attacks most
likely conducted by jihad activists.
This
kind of perception can be assumed to be a consequence of the
energetic activism of those radical Muslims exploiting such different strategies.
Such a kind of public perception
proves to have led to the shift of
popular understanding about Islamic radicalism from the doubt of the
existence of one of its wings, JI, to the increasingly positive responses
towards the struggles of radical Muslims. Rather
than
maintaining their doubt of the existence of JI, people start to formulate their ideas to deal with the struggles of Islamic
radicalism. The bombardment of information and messages through such
different strategies
(publication and physical
action) has imparted a message to the public that JI, and other
radical Muslim groups,
has
attracted popular attention, and hence becomes a popular concern. Global geopolitics and the increasing conservative understanding of Islamic doctrines of
jihad pose a new subject of study, and therefore
deserve a thorough analysis in order to get a better comprehension of such a growing
public perception. Kinds of research on these two issues appear to be significant
to undertake.
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